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Post-crisis reform was one of the most comprehensive and decisive reform that was 
implemented in Korea. This paper develops a model of reform dynamics. This paper 
subsequently uses this model to discuss the following arguments. First, while reform 
tends to achieve some nominal success in terms of making new laws and several 
quantifiable targets, it has not been able to achieve much success in really changing 
institutional conventions, habit and beliefs, such as enhancing transparency in the 
management or trust in labor relations. Second, it had mixed results as a result of the 
reform process involved tension between global standard and local specificity. Third, one 
source of the implementation difficulty in reform has to do with the institutional 
complementarities, and we need to take a proper sequence in reforms. One possible 
logical sequence seems to be moving from banking reform, corporate governance, labor 
relations, and finally to business restructuring. The paper concludes by tossing up a 
question of whether the Korean response (the reform blueprint) was right.
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INTRODUCTION
Once famous for its rapid economic growth and tagged as an East Asian 
miracle, Korea was subject to the shame of being one of the crisis-struck 
economies. However, the Korean economy also showed one of the quickest 
and strongest turn-round since 1999. While some attribute this recovery to 
the reform achievement, others still challenge this view and observe that 
not-much has been changed actually. 
We consider Korea as a very unique country which has experienced, 
within a very short period of time, “everything” from miracle to crisis, and 
a stunning turn-around. As such, the Korean case raises two important 
issues. The first issue is how to link the old success regime to the recent crisis. 
In other words, the financial crisis of 1997 has again brought to surface the 
old debate on the role of market vs. state in economic development. On one 
side is the market-based view that finds state intervention in financial 
markets (i.e., over-regulation by government and/or crony capitalism) as a 
culprit for the crisis (Summers, 1998). On the other side is the statist view that 
blames the crisis on the reckless deregulation of financial markets inspired 
by neo-liberalism (Chang, 1998; Crotty and Lee, 2001). 
While this first question has been sufficiently addressed by the literature, 
another issue that needs to be resolved is the need to interpret the post-crisis 
reform and the subsequent quick recovery. Some studies on this subject do 
not dig into the broad questions of whether the Korean growth regime has 
really changed, whether institutional reform can be done so quickly and 
thoroughly, and whether recovery is really due to the reform (C. Lee et al., 
2007; Coe and Kim, 2002; Hooley and Yoo, 2002).
Examining how Korea’s economic systems have been reformed offers an 
exemplary case study of the process and outcome of the reform intended to 
introduce global standards but conditioned by a country’s political economy 
and initial conditions. This study will examine the role that various interest 
groups (agents) played in the reform and how initial conditions constrained 
its process and the performance of the system that has emerged from that 
process. Specifically, the study will examine the role played by chaebols, 
bureaucrats, external pressures, and the prevailing ideas on reform and 
liberalization espoused in academia. Thereby, the analysis will reveal the 
motivating reasons for reform initiatives and will identify the factors 
responsible for the success and failure parts of the reforms in Korea. For 
instance, we will discuss how the influence of chaebols and the strategic 
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behavior of bureaucrats affected and/or manipulated the choice of reform 
blueprint as well as its implementations. This is borne out of the prediction 
of the thesis of economic entrenchment proposed in Morck, Wolfenzon, and 
Yeung (2004). We also aimed to find out how the initial conditions, such as 
segmented labor markets, high premium for owner-controller of the firm, 
and so on, affected the course of corporate restructuring so that the standard 
Anglo-Saxon model has not realized at its purist form, and/or has not 
worked as originally expected. This is consistent with the argument by 
Rodrick, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) stating that desirable institutional 
arrangements have a large element of context specificity arising from 
differences in historical trajectories.
As analyzed in K. Lee (2006), Fanelli and McMahon (2005) and Fanelli and 
Popov (2005), questions regarding the reform can be addressed in terms of 
the followings. First, why were some countries able to undertake reform 
while others were not? Second, what factors enabled some countries to 
successfully implement their reform programs while the programs failed in 
others? Third, why were some reforms more successful at delivering the 
expected outcomes than others? This paper is also an attempt to answer these 
questions.
Korea has been relatively successful in carrying out policy and 
institutional reform. However, it is yet to be seen whether this success has 
served the country well by putting the economy on a sustainable growth. It 
is important to find this out because new institutions, especially when they 
are alien institutions such as so-called “global standards,” do not necessarily 
work harmoniously with locally-specific institutions. That is, successful 
institutional reform ― successful not simply in changing institutions but in 
achieving its ultimate objectives ― is not simply a matter of transplanting an 
institution from another society. Moreover, it must contribute to helping the 
country achieve a sustainable economic growth.
The next section discusses a theoretical framework for analysis and 
derives several hypotheses. Section Three is the main part that provides an 
analysis of the post-crisis reform to verify the hypotheses. Finally, the paper 
concludes with a summary of the findings of the study and a reflection on the 
current state of the Korean economy.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: A MODEL OF DYNAMICS OF 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
Currently, a new consensus in economic development beyond the 
Washington consensus has emerged. This consensus recognizes institution 
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as a dominant determinant over others of economic development 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Rodrik et al., 2002). Institutions of 
a given society affect the path of its economic development by structuring 
political, economic, and social interactions among its members (Greif, 1994; 
North, 1981; Williamson, 1985). As such, institutions can either promote 
economic development or retard it. As noted by North (1998), societies that 
are stuck in an “institutional matrix” and do not evolve into impersonal 
exchange will fail to achieve economic growth, as they are unable to capture 
productivity gains that come from the specialization and division of labor. 
Thus, one of the critical things that the developing countries must undertake 
to bring about economic development is to introduce “correct”institutions in 
the areas of market regulating, market stabilizing, and market legitimizing 
(Rodrik et al., 2004). 
FIGURE 1. MODEL OF REFORM DYNAMICS: INTERPLAY OF DIVERSE MODELS AND 
INTERESTS.
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But for a number of reasons, such institutional reform is difficult to 
implement and that has to do with the incompatibility that may exist 
between initial conditions or local specificity on the one hand and the 
institutions being introduced into the country on the other (Lin and Nugent, 
1995: 2362). This is demonstrated in the case of reforms in the transition 
economies in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, the mere transplantation of 
successful institutions from DCs to LDCs is unlikely to have the expected 
positive effects on performance. 
In our theoretical framework, the reform is perceived like a two-stage 
game. First, it involves the formation of the reform blueprint, and, the second 
is the blueprint implementation (see figure 1 above). Various players 
participate in the formation of the blueprint and its implementation (figure 
2). Thus, diverse ideas, theories, and interests compete against each other in 
this reform game. We posit that there exists an ideal blueprint, and that the 
actual blueprint tends to deviate from this ideal because it is affected by the 
contests among theories and interest groups. The same is posited for the 
implementation process, such that actual implementation tends to fall short 
of ideal implementation.
The ideal blueprint is the one that reflects objectively the existing reality of 
the economy (the initial conditions) and the existing economic theories or 
ideas. Some key components of the initial conditions (or local specificity) 
include: the historical role and perception of the state in the economy, the 
long prevailing structure of ownership and governance in firms, and the 
level and structure of trust between management and labor. Depending 
FIGURE 2. PLAYERS AND STRATEGIES IN REFORM-DYNAMICS IN KOREA.
Players and their goals
<External> 
 IMF:  stability of financial order and international legitimacy
 MNCs:  investment return and access to the local market
<Local>  
 Big Business: continuing control over the firm
 Government: economic growth and political popularity
 Bureaucrats: private benefits and promotion
 Labor: economic security and political power
 NGOs: values (justice, equity; transparency etc)
Strategies
Each player proposes its own inputs/ideas for reform process to maximize their objectives
<Stage 1> Formation of the Blueprint for reform
<Stage 2> Implementation of the Blueprint
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upon which economic theories are adopted, the interpretation of reality 
(data) is different and the prescription is also different. For example, at the 
time of the crisis, the dominant economic view was that Korea needed to 
follow the Anglo-Saxon model of the economy as the old “Korean” or “east 
Asian” model failed and resulted in the economic crisis. In other words, the 
old model was suddenly abandoned despite the miraculous achievement in 
the past decades.
Thus, we can state the first hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1: 
A possible tension between the global standard vs. local specificity tends to become 
the cause for the mixed results and/or the sources for conflicts.
With this hypothesis, we would like to emphasize the correct handling of 
conflicting goals and ideas to reconcile the tension between the global and 
local standards. First, leadership should identify the correct reform goal, and 
then study the initial conditions (local specificities) of the country to write a 
good blueprint suitable for the goal. It must be kept in mind that global 
standards are often suitable only for developed countries (eg. a bias for 
profitability against growth).
In our model, whatever the “ideal blueprint” may be, the actual blueprint 
is affected by various objectives of interest groups and their habits 
(behavioral patterns. eg, inertia, rigidity, and so on). It involves the interests 
of the IMF and MNCs as external interests. It is also affected by those of local 
interest groups, such as big business, bureaucrats, labor and so on. Each of 
these players has its own objectives and habits, and tries to represent its 
interests toward the blueprint (see figure 2). For example, the chaebols 
wanted to keep their control over the business empire, whereas the 
bureaucrats wanted to preserve their influence over the economy and 
tended to rely on “uniform regulations” as reform measures (Jwa, 2003). 
Workers wanted to be economically secure and protected by social safety 
nets. For their part, civil activists or NGOs pursued such values as justice, 
transparency and equity with less concern about economic competitiveness. 
The voices of those interest groups had a significant effect on the actual 
course of the reforms undertaken in Korea. The political elite and 
bureaucrats, who were used to the practices of command and discretion, 
now began to be increasingly co-opted by interest groups, and the vested 
interests of domestic producers who benefited from those practices fought 
their read-guard action against the forces of change. They did this by 
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blocking or distorting the reform efforts in many sectors in the economy. 
Consequently, the reforms that were actually implemented were an outcome 
of conflicts and contradiction between these traditional and new forces.
As a consequence of complicated interest politics, the actual blueprint 
would be far from the ideal blueprint. The gap between ideal and actual 
blueprints can be a source for the low performance of reforms. Even after the 
agreement on the blueprint, however, the process of implementation itself is 
again subject to interest politics. We note that in the implementation stage, 
local interest groups tended to raise their voices more effectively and 
succeed in representing their interests, whereas these local interests or ideas 
were dominated by the “global standards” and external pressures or 
interests during the stage to form the blueprint. Furthermore, one of the 
difficulties in bringing radical changes has to do with the durability of 
informal institutions which constrain the type and speed of changes in the 
areas of formal institutions because the newly-introduced formal 
institutions must be compatible with informal institutions if they are to be 
effective (Lin and Nugent, 1995). For these reasons, we can expect that the 
actual implementation of the blueprint is likely to deviate from the ideal 
implementation and that their impacts will be limited or distorted. Thus, we 
have the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2:
2-1. While reforms tend to make more successes in the area of quantifiable or 
tangible targets, less satisfactory are often the areas related to the habits and 
intangible institutions. 
2-2. Even the quantifiable or more visible successes are often made in a disguised 
manner without real changes. This tendency could in turn result in unintended 
“undesirable” consequences, such as eroding future growth potentials.
The case of the post-crisis reform in Korea is consistent with the above 
stated hypothesis. The initial state of the economy at the beginning of the 
reform was characterized by the following: an economy under heavy 
regulation by the state bureaucrats; family-controlled business with opaque 
corporate governance; confrontational labor-management relations; and 
state-owned or controlled banks. After the waves of the reform, the present 
state of the economy seems to be the same from the initial conditions 
although some progress has been made. One pattern we noticed is that the 
reforms tend to achieve some nominal successes in terms of making new 
laws and several quantifiable targets (eg. debt-equity ratio standards; the 
introduction of outside directors in the corporate board), and to be more 
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successful in the areas where interests conflicts are less acute. In contrast, the 
reforms tend to make little successes or take more time in really changing 
institutional conventions, habits and beliefs, such as enhancing transparency 
in management or trust in labor relations. 
While the hypothesis addresses the consequences of strategic responses 
from the agents who are affected by the reforms, the reformers face some 
difficulties as the result of the inter-connected nature of various institutions 
comprising a national economy. We need to find out the ‘general 
equilibrium” blueprint and/or take a proper sequence in reforms because the 
character of one reform critically depends on the character of the others. It is 
important for the reformers to recognize this point.
The concept of institutional complementarity has been utilized in various 
contexts since Aoki and Okuno (1996) introduced it to explain the Japanese 
economic system, more especially in the debate on shock therapy vs. 
gradualism in transition economies. In the case of reform in Korea, we also 
have found various examples of complementarity or clustering of 
institutions. For example, a successful banking reform would involve the 
writing-offs of bad loans, debt restructuring, and prudential regulation. 
These are directly linked to business restructuring and labor market reform. 
However, to go ahead with business restructuring, it encounters the 
difficulty associated with the owner-controlled nature of Korean firms and 
corporate governance. In labor market reform, the low level of transparency 
in management and governance tends to interfere with the reform effort to 
bring in more flexibility in the labor market. The above discussion suggests 
the following logical (maybe not practical) sequence of reforms. It involves 
the movement from banking reform, to corporate governance reform, to 
labor relations reform, and then finally to business restructuring. Thus, we 
have the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3:
3-1. One source of the implementation difficulty in reform has to do with 
institutional complementarity (Aoki and Okuno, 1996) among sectors. 
3-2. In consideration of the inter-connectedness of institutions, the reform 
implementation should take a proper sequence, possibly moving from banking 
reform, to corporate governance reform, to labor relations reform, and then finally to 
business restructuring .
ANALYSIS OF REFORM DYNAMICS
In this section, we provide an analysis of several cases in the post-crisis 
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reform in Korea with a view to verify the hypotheses derived in Section Two. 
Verifications are done by delving deeper into the cases consistent with the 
hypotheses.
1) Tension between the Global vs. Local Standards
Hypothesis 1: A tension between the global standard vs. local specificity tends to 
become the cause for mixed results and/or the sources for conflicts.
Case 1: Tension in corporate governance reform
Anglo-Saxon model vs. chaebols
What would have been the ideal blueprint for corporate governance and 
restructuring in post-crisis Korea? The Korean model had no solid 
theoretical model despite its great achievement in the past. Thus, it failed to 
defend itself successfully against the sudden pressure of the global or 
Anglo-Saxon model. The only defense of the Korean model was its 
successful economy, but the financial crisis and the collapse of many Korean 
firms nullified this position in a day. Therefore, the dominant blueprint 
became the Anglo-Saxon model in the post-crisis reform era. 
The core of the Anglo-Saxon model is known to be the central position of 
shareholder value in corporate governance. Along this line, we can find the 
definition of efficient corporate governance. Shleifer and Vishny (2000) state 
that the efficiency of the corporate governance system should be considered 
in view of the possibility that investors can get back the returns from their 
investment. They also pointed out two concrete conditions to construct an 
efficient corporate governance system in firms. The first is the existence of 
large shareholders as holders of negligible share would not have much 
interest in monitoring firm behaviors and management because they are 
subject to the free-rider problem. Here, there may be two types of large 
shareholders. The one is the permanent large shareholder, like the main 
banks in Japan and Germany or owner-families in Korean firms. The other is 
the contingent large shareholder, which appears as a take-over bidder or an 
LBO association in M&A only when the firms perform badly. This is the case 
of Anglo-Saxon firms. The large debt-holder is also eligible because they too 
have a big stake in the firms where they lend their money.
The second condition for efficient corporate governance is the protection of 
minority shareholders’ rights against possible expropriation by the controlling 
shareholders. As such, diverse devices have appeared for this purpose, such as 
derivative suits, rights of access to accounting books and so on.
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We can see that the underlying idea of conditions for the efficient 
corporate governance system is that there should be an owner-controller 
who has a vital stake in firms and takes responsibility for outcomes. At the 
same time, while such a person is given authority and initiative to run firms, 
he should not be allowed to sacrifice the interests of non-controlling minority 
shareholders. 
While these are general conditions for efficient corporate governance, we 
can address another issue which is especially important in the Korean 
context, namely, the reduction of chances of enjoying private benefits by 
being the controlling-owner. This is important because the reason for the 
controlling-owner to want to set up the controlling minority structure is to 
enjoy private benefits from such control. The bigger the private benefits from 
controlling firms, the more likely it is for the controlling-owner to take the 
otherwise-unjustifiable projects. In a similar context, Bebchuk (1999) 
observes that the founder of a firm would like to maintain control over the 
firm, rather than take the firm public, when there is a bigger private benefit 
which is available. The same logic applies to the case of a CMS (controlling 
minority structure) firm. The controller would like to maintain the CMS 
structure as long as it continues to give him/her private benefits. Therefore, 
if the CMS or the separation of control rights and cash flow rights is the 
source of the problem for the chaebols, then we have to first reduce the 
private benefits from controlling the firm. Then, the owner-controller would 
have less incentive to maintain the CMS setup of the firm by circular 
stock-ownership and/or stock-pyramids. In the Korean context, the higher 
protection of non-controlling shareholders’ rights, and the more disclosure 
of accounting and financial information of a firm would be effective.
Now, given the dominance of the Anglo-Saxon model and the definition of 
efficient corporate governance, let us examine to what extent the Korean 
reform followed this model and blueprint. First, we can see that we should 
not try to get rid of the owner-controller from Korean firms. It is so good to 
have a family that has a stake in the firms. Rather it is necessary to induce 
them to increase their share in the firms. Second, there is a definite urgency 
to increase and protect the rights of non-controlling shareholders and 
investors. Third, it is important to reduce the private benefits of the 
controlling shareholders. Fourth, if we are also concerned with 
competitiveness of firms, the firms are to be given full freedom in their 
investment decision-making. Then, the revival of regulation on inter-firm 
equity investment within each big business group should be avoided. Any 
shortcomings or illegal matter had better be handled now by shareholder 
activism than by the clumsy visible hands of the government.
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Now let us compare this ideal blueprint with the actual blueprint. Then, we 
first notice that despite the fact that the active role of the board is not one of 
critical components in the ideal blueprint, post-crisis corporate reform put 
heavy emphasis on the reform of the board system and the introduction of 
outsider directors. However, as noted before, the board is a key institution in 
the Anglo-Saxon model of firms, and it is important because the board is 
expected to provide a check and balance against management so as to alleviate 
an agency costs problem between shareholders and the top management. 
Nonetheless, it is also well known that the board’s role in this check and 
balance is limited because directors on the board are usually friends of the top 
management.
A more critical area should be the strengthening of the rights of 
non-controlling shareholders in light of the ideal blue print. Shareholders’ 
rights have of course increased in terms of the threshold for exercising rights 
to file suit, making proposals at a general meeting, the inspection of firms’ 
accounts, and the dismissal of directors. But a class action suit against 
directors, which is one of the most effective tools to enhance the rights of 
shareholders was not introduced early, but delayed for a later period like 
2002. It seems somewhat strange why the scheme was put off for a later 
period. Maybe the Anglo-Saxon package did not realize the importance of 
this measure, or maybe the strategy of big business was to allow 
not-so-critical components such as the outside directors but to try to delay 
this critical measure like a class action. Only a few agree that currently in 
Korea the non-controlling shareholders have effective means to protect their 
rights in a firm. It is for this reasons that we can say that the second important 
conditions for efficient corporate governance have not yet been fulfilled in 
Korea. In this sense, it was a kind of “partial implementation” (Ruie and van 
de Walle, 2003) meaning that the least onerous components or the ones that 
have the least impact on the status quo tend to be implemented.
Reversal of the global standards: the revival of the cap on equity investment
If non-controlling shareholders are given effective means (e.g. class 
actions) to protect their rights (invested capital and returns), then the 
government would neither have to worry so much about firm management 
nor have to maintain so many regulations over the behaviors of firms. In this 
regard, one interesting example is the regulation against equity investment 
by a company to other companies. The Korean government and the Fair 
Trade Commission, a government bureaucracy, set a maximum limit of the 
equity investment as 25 to 40% of net assets of each affiliated-company. It 
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was well known that with this circulating equity-investment among 
affiliates, the chaebol families had been able to keep their control over their 
business empires, and it seemed natural for the regulation body to try to limit 
such investment. However, it was against the global standards since it 
regulated the investment behaviors of private firms. In the US, there were no 
such restrictions. Furthermore, the foreigners’ share-holding increased 
rapidly with the opening of the domestic stock market and the heavy inflow 
of foreign portfolio investment in the market. Korean firms then complained 
about the possibility of hostile takeovers by foreign firms, whereas they 
could not defend themselves given the regulation against the inter-firm 
investment. Such a restriction against investment was also perceived as a 
hindrance to restructuring, an entry into new businesses and an exit from old 
businesses. Thus, this regulation was abolished in February 1998.
However, from April 2001, just three year after the abolishment, the 
restriction was reinstated. It was argued that without this restriction, the 
chaebols had been trying to just issue more stocks to meet the requirement 
for reducing debt-equity ratios rather than paying off their debts. As table 1 
shows, the debt-equity ratios actually declined substantially without paying 
off debts. This was made possible as the top chaebols issued simply more 
stocks taking advantage of the re-bounding stock markets. However, this 
revival of investment restriction signifies the reversal of the global standards 
or the reform by the bureaucrats. While many foreign firms have now 
entered the Korean market competing with Korean firms, and while any 
former barriers to M&As are now all abolished, it is against the market 
principle that Korean firms are discriminated in terms of investment. Owing 
to this restriction, many Korea firms now find themselves exposed to hostile 
M&As, as exemplified by the famous case in 2003-5 of the SK Corp. versus 
TABLE 1. REFORM OF CAPITAL AND BUSINESS STRUCTURE AND THE OUTCOMES





6th-30th   chaebols Top 30
chaebols6th-10th 11th-20th 21th-30th 6th-30th
2002 end 177.14% 135.95% 353.61% 232.78% 261.75% 247.65%
2001 end 171.19%
2000 end 253.21% 193.42% 707.33% 57.94% 344.79% 329.53%
1999 end 212.02% 234.21% 330.55% 627.53% 430.07% 393.73%
1998 end 335.00% 497.70%
1997 end 472.90% 616.80%
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<Part B. Gross Debt ― Simple Average> 
<Part C. Net Profits or Losses ― Simple Average>
* Net Profit = (Revenue - Cost) - Interest ― Tax = Operating Profit - Interest ― Tax
= Ordinary Profit ― Tax
<Part D. Net Profits/Sales ― Simple Average> 
Source: Korean Fair Trade Commission (released in April each year).
the Sovereign Asset Management, and they are spending substantial 
amount of firm resources to defend themselves. 
Despite not being a component of the global standards, the regulation of 
inter-firm investment was revived as a need of political leadership to satisfy 
activist NGO groups and general attitudes in the Korean public against the 





6th-30th   chaebols Top 30
chaebols6th-10th 11th-20th 21th-30th 6th-30th
2002 end 56.93 13.64 11.04 3.92 8.55 16.61
2001 end
2000 end 51.01 10.98 6.03 2.71 5.69 13.24
1999 end 47.02 13.19 5.37 3.87 6.33 13.11
1998 end 46.91 5.30





6th-30th   chaebols Top 30
chaebols6th-10th 11th-20th 21th-30th 6th-30th
2002 end 6.69% 5.81% 3.04% 1.14% 2.83% 3.48%
2001 end
2000 end 1.06% 2.16% -2.01% -20.12% -8.42% -6.84%
1999 end** 2.97% -16.74% 3.41% -19.21% -9.67% -7.56%
1998 end -3.30% -7.90% -4.50%






6th-30th   chaebols Top 30
chaebols6th-10th 11th-20th 21th-30th 6th-30th
2002 end 4.67 0.97 0.11 0.10 0.28 1.01
2001 end
2000 end 1.08 0.35 -0.15 -0.23 -0.08 0.11
1999 end 1.68 -3.96 5.37 -0.39 -0.90 -0.47
1998 end -0.95
1997 end -3.2
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want to maintain their influence. In a sense, it might be called another 
example, or a Korean version, of clientalism, although in this case the clients 
were not big business but NGOs and populism (Ruis and De Walle, 2003).
Rigid imposition of the global standards: the debt-equity ratio of 200%
Another important reform measure was the reduction of debt-equity 
ratios. In the Anglo-Saxon model and in most developed countries, the 
debt-equity ratio of firms is lower than 200%, while it used to be around 400% 
in Korea. With the development of the capital market, progress in related 
reforms, and the experience of financial crisis itself, it is natural to expect a 
gradual and eventual decline of this ratio in Korean firms. But the Korean 
government declared the uniform and abrupt goal of the 200% as the 
ultimate target. While Korean firms actually fulfilled this target, it is out of 
question that such a uniform regulation is neither efficient nor beneficial to 
competitiveness (Jwa, 2003). An acceptable or optimal debt-equity ratio 
varies among firms, industries and countries. 
The issue of the uniform reduction of debt ratios is the problem of both the 
blueprint and implementation accorded to our model. A preference for such 
extraordinary practices like uniform regulation sits at the bottom of the habit 
set of the Korean government and bureaucrats. As a legacy of state-led 
industrialization, the paternalistic government, refusing to discriminate 
among different firms, has often found it “politically safe” to apply the same 
disciplinary measures to all firms across the board (Jwa, 2003).
Case 2: Tension in the Labor Market Reform and the Consequences
Whereas the post-crisis reform aimed to restore market principles in the 
bureaucratically-structured labor market, the interaction with local politics 
and power relations among major actors and groups has produced such a 
segmented labor market, in which core sector workers are over-protected 
while periphery workers are marginalized. 
The gap between aspiration and achievement cannot be explained without 
considering local specificity, such as the institutional and cultural context for 
reform. Whereas the central intent of the reform agenda was to alter Korea’s 
institutions, the reform effort was itself embedded in that same institutional 
matrix. As a result, it was inevitably compromised. Notwithstanding the 
apparent triumph of the market, the acclimation of domestic culture and 
social institutions to the imperatives of economic and financial liberalization 
and “global standard” remains incomplete.
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One of the key reasons for the confusion and conflict during the post-crisis 
labor reform is closely related with the conflict between two different types 
of the economic system. In return for the bailout program, the IMF imposed 
the liberal market model that had been a ready-made prescription for the 
economic illness in Latin America or in Eastern Europe. Without enough 
time to reflect on the validity of the model, then-President Kim Dae Jung 
hastily accepted the prescription of the IMF. 
Reviewing the history of capitalism, we find varieties of capitalism based 
on different institutions and reflecting diverse natural environment, culture 
and historical backgrounds (Hall, 1986). Notwithstanding the differences in 
the details, the Korean version of capitalism has been rather closer to the 
Japanese than the Anglo-American or European version of capitalism. This 
is revealed in a close relationship between state and business, the 
enterprise-based welfare system, and firm-based internal labor markets. 
However, after the economic crisis, the reform was equated with imposing 
the global standard, which is in fact another name of the Anglo-American 
model, on the local context. However, we find at least three different types of 
institutions are mixed as a result of the reform. First of all, restructuring and 
change in corporate governance were based on the Anglo-American model, 
while the tripartite commission consisting of labor, business and 
government representatives was based on the European model of “private 
interest governments.” In this model, the state delegates its power to the 
peak organizations in labor and business sectors. For their parts, these peak 
organizations with representation and power over their affiliated members 
coordinate and bear the responsibility for macro-economic policy. Two 
different blueprints were in conflict with each other, and with the local 
employment system.
Anglo-American model and increasing segmentation as its consequence 
The Korean employment regime (K-type hereafter) is quite different from 
the Anglo-American employment regime (A-type hereafter) as a result of the 
long tradition of paternalism and its propensity for a long-term relationship 
between employers and employees. This Korean model resembles the 
Japanese employment system in several points, especially its emphasis on 
harmony among workers and the role of leadership and teamwork. Wages 
are determined by seniority of workers, having a very rigid structure that is 
well protected from the fluctuation of economic environment. Therefore, the 
speed of promotion becomes the main incentive, as it ultimately determines 
the amount of life-long remunerations. In the Korean model, like the 
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Japanese case, the most important skills are firm-specific and general, and 
knowledges regarding the management of human networks within and 
between organizations. 
It is obvious that the Korean type employment has characteristics opposite 
to the Anglo-American system, or to the “global standard” of the 
employment system. Therefore, labor market reforms come as a shock in 
several aspects. First, layoffs give more impact on K-type workers than to 
A-type workers. Layoffs deprive of the contextual knowledge from workers, 
as it is embedded in tightly coupled employment relationship in the K-type 
system. As a K-type is a ‘task-oriented system,’ laid-off workers find it more 
difficult to find a comparable job in different firms. Secondly, the dynamism 
of K-type employment has been maintained by the rapid growth of the 
economy and the implicit agreement that the workplace is a ground for 
life-long commitment comparable to the family. However, the economic 
crisis and stagnation have destroyed the myth of family-like and life-long 
engagement. Economic stagnation undermined the stability of the 
promotion system. Thus, this renders some higher positions increasingly 
redundant. Thirdly, many companies have identified layoffs as a panacea to 
their problems. For the first time in Korea’s recent economic history, these 
core workers, usually highly educated managers and skilled technicians, 
became the target of mass layoffs. However, mass layoffs of core members 
undermined the moral foundation of the K-type system, such as harmony 
and commitment. Gradually, the implementation of layoffs confronted the 
resistance of labor, especially in the well-organized sector. 
Eventually, the main burden of labor markets is the enhanced flexibility that 
was borne by “labor” via the “labor-market flexibility” mechanism prevalent 
in the Anglo-American countries. It is not surprising that joblessness rose, 
particularly among unskilled workers (see table 2). As shown in the table, the 
unemployment rate of teenagers was 20.8% in 1998, and that of the age group 
in their 20s was 11.4%. In 2002, the overall unemployment rate was 3.1%, while 
that of teenagers showed 11.1%, of people in their 20s 6.3%, in their 30s 2.8%, 
and in their 40s 1.9% respectively. Unemployment and underemployment rose 
in terms of both quantity and duration. There appeared a significant 
proportion of “atypical,” part-time and daily workers in the “employed” pool.
Flexibility was most needed in large firms. The increase of non-regular 
workers was least noticeable there, while the proportion of non-regular 
workers increased very fast in small- and medium-sized firms. It shows that 
the burden of introducing flexibility at the macro-level was unequally 
imposed in the labor market. As a result, the dual structure of the labor 
market was strengthened, and the market was segmented into the core 
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TABLE 2. UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY AGE GROUP
Source: Statistical Office. Statistical Yearbook of Labor (various years).
and the periphery. The unions of large firms, led by KCTU, used the 
opportunity to demand massive wage increases, and the wage gap between 
large and small firms continued to grow. The unions of large firms increased 
their job security at the cost of new employment of the youth and the wage 
of peripheral workers. It is noteworthy that the scapegoat is the youth group. 
The unemployment rate of the youth skyrocketed at the beginning of the 
crisis, and it still remains very high. Increasing inequality is reflected in the 
Gini coefficient, which rose from 0.283 to 0.320 between 1997 and 1999.
Implanting the European corporatist model to the Korean soil 
For the first time in Korean history, the government, business, and two 
labor organizations established the Tripartite Commission (TC). The 
Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and the more radical Korean 
Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) joined the TC. The promotion of 
labor market flexibility was the most important among the agenda agreed by 
the TC. The union accepted employers’ right of redundancy lay-off and 
dispatch of workers. In return, unions were entitled to more political 
representation, unemployment insurance, and extended social safety nets. 
The pact was regarded as the elimination of a major barrier to the economic 















60 Years old 
& over
1990 2.4 9.2 4.9 1.6 1.2 1.1 0.4
1991 2.4 9.3 4.9 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.3
1992 2.5 10.2 5.3 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.4
1993 2.9 11.0 6.3 1.8 1.2 1.0 0.4
1994 2.5 9.3 5.4 1.6 1.3 0.8 0.3
1995 2.1 7.9 4.3 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.4
1996 2.0 7.4 4.4 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.4
1997 2.6 9.8 5.3 1.9 1.5 1.2 0.8
1998 7.0 20.8 11.4 5.7 5.6 5.3 2.4
1999 6.3 19.5 10.1 5.3 5.2 5.1 2.3
2000 4.1 13.8 7.1 3.4 3.3 2.9 1.3
2001 3.8 13.3 7.0 3.0 2.8 2.6 1.1
2002 3.1 11.1 6.3 2.8 1.9 1.8 1.0
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committee was hurriedly constructed without institutional legacy. There are 
several reasons for the failure of the TC in Korea. Despite the potentials 
shown during its initial years, the impacts of the TC accord are mixed. The 
TC has contributed to the maintenance of social peace at the early stage of the 
reform, but it failed to stabilize industrial relations. 
First of all, there is no tradition of party-politics based on class- cleavages 
in Korea. The TC was rather an arbitrary arrangement without the support of 
the political party that represents the interests of the working class. Both 
KCTU and FKTU did not hold the real power to properly represent affiliated 
unions. Enterprise-based unionism, which has been the tradition in Korean 
trade unionism, was not functionally compatible to the TC that was 
developed in a corporatist institutional framework. As the peak labor 
organizations have neither the capacity for policy-making nor the power to 
impose their decisions to affiliated unions, the social pact became a mere 
scrap of papers. Secondly, Korean companies have developed the 
enterprise-based employment system. This is represented by the internal 
labor market of firms. Likewise, labor unions tried to develop an isomorphic 
structure to respond effectively to the enterprise-based employment system. 
Companies tried to develop “employee consciousness” and trade unions 
responded with “union-member consciousness,” but both of them were 
based on the same enterprise. 
2) Visible Success and Invisible Failure
Hypothesis 2: 
2-1. While reforms tend to be more successful in the area of quantifiable or tangible 
targets, less satisfactory are often the areas related to habits and intangible 
institutions. 
2-2. Even the quantifiable or more visible successes are often made in a disguised 
manner without real changes. This tendency could in turn result in unintended 
“undesirable” consequences, such as eroding growth potentials.
Case 3: Post-crisis Corporate Governance Reforms
Post-crisis corporate restructuring has significantly improved the capital 
and business structure by reducing debt-equity ratios and increasing 
profitability. This should be taken as very important because in the past the 
typical strategy by the chaebols in response to any government reform 
initiatives against them tended to be a “time earning” strategy, delaying the 
implementation of any specific measures as long as possible. However, it is 
important to realize that the reduction of debt-equity ratios was not made by 
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paying off debts, but by issuing more stocks. In part B of the table 1, the 
average amount of the gross debt in the top 5 chaebols rather increased from 
less than 50 trillion won to more than 50 trillion won between 1997 and 2002, 
and the other smaller business groups showed the same trend in this regard. 
In other words, quantifiable or more visible successes were often made in a 
disguised manner without real changes.
Next, the outcomes are even less satisfactory or mixed when we look at the 
areas where the habits and mindsets of firms are involved. In table 3, let us 
first look at the survey results of corporate governance in ten Asian countries 
done by CLSA in 2001 and 2002. According to table 3 part A, the scores of 
TABLE 3. RESULTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SURVEY IN ASIA
<Part A. Overall Scores> 
Source: CLSA (2001 and 2002), recited from Jang (2003). 
<Part B. Rank by Areas> 
Source: CLSA (2001 and 2002), recited from Jang (2003).
Countries
2002 2001 Change from 2001
Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking Score
　Singapore 1 65.4 1 64.5 0 0.9
　Hong Kong 2 64.4 2 62.9 0 1.5
　Malaysia 3 64.1 3 56.6 0 7.5
　India 4 62.2 4 55.6 0 6.6
　Korea 5 62.0 8 47.1 3 14.9
　Thailand 6 60.0 5 55.1 -1 4.9
　Taiwan 7 59.2 6 54.6 -1 4.6
　China 8 50.8 7 49.1 -1 1.7
　Philippines 9 44.0 9 43.9 0 0.1
　Indonesia 10 38.2 10 37.3 0 0.9
Korea Ranking in Asia 10
2001 2002
Changes in Ranking





Disciplin 6 8 2
Transparenc 1 8 7
Independenc 7 4 -3
Accountabilit 2 4 2
Responsibilit 7 8 1
Fairnes 7 9 2
Social awarenes 2 4 2
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Korea have increased from 47.1 in 2001 to 62.0 in 2002 with its ranking 
improved from the 8th to 5th. In part B of table 3, such improvements are 
decomposed into several sub-areas. 
It shows that transparency improved its ranking in a great degree, possibly 
reflecting the requirement to file the consolidated/combined financial 
statement. Also, a progress has been made in such areas as accountability 
and responsibility, reflecting the increased rights of shareholders. Although 
class actions are still not allowed in Korea, we can say that the rights of 
general shareholders are now better recognized than before. We are now 
seeing and hearing many cases, which we have never heard before. In these 
cases, minority shareholders raise objections to, or raise sues to, the 
transactions of the top management or controlling shareholders. Actually, 
the increasing rights of minority shareholders have become part of the social 
movement, involving an organization called “People's Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy”(PSPD). In the meantime, management is now 
starting to say that independent management is increasingly threatened by 
such movements as activists are promoting shareholders’ rights. Such a 
voice from management is understandable too, given the lack of sufficient 
“business judgment” safe harbors as in the American system (OECD, 1998). 
Now, an increasing number of Korean companies are buying their directors 
insurances for their legal liabilities in preparation for increasing lawsuits. In 
sum, the important matter should be how to balance the interests of 
management and shareholders and, furthermore, how to align these two 
interests. The OECD (1998) suggests that a performance-based 
compensation is a useful tool for this purpose, with stock options as one of 
the best. However, in Korea the stock option measure is just being 
introduced although it is being spread very rapidly.
Turning back to the survey results in table 3, one noteworthy feature is that 
all sub-areas have made progress except the independence of the boards. We 
take this feature very telling. All other aspects such as transparency, 
accountability and responsibility are measured in the survey by specific 
quantifiable or tangible targets. For example, the survey asked whether 
shareholders can demand the general meeting of shareholders and whether 
they have the rights to see accounting books, and whether group-affiliated 
firms report consolidated and/or combined financial statements and so on. 
As you see, these are basically minimal formal requirements and cannot be 
directly translated into transparency, accountability, and responsibility. 
However, an assessment of the independence of the board requires a 
subjective or qualitative perception, and in this area the survey shows 
deterioration. The appointment of outside members on the boards has been 
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TABLE 4. RANKING FOR COMPETITIVENESS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 2002
<Part A. IMD Survey>
Source: IMD (2002), recited from Jang (2003). 
<Part B. WEF Survey>
Source: WEF (2002), recited from Jang (2003).
one of the core reform measures, and the role of the boards may have more 
direct links to corporate governance than other aspects.
Table 4 compares Korea’s ranking in national competitiveness with that in 
corporate governance. We see there is a substantial gap in the results by both 
the IMD and the WEF (World Economic Forum). 
Korea was ranked as the 27th in national competitiveness, but its ranking in 
corporate governance is well below this. Also, in this comparison, the 
ranking in corporate boards (independence) is lowest. At present, in most 
cases, these independent directors are known not to play any active role in 
corporate governance, with a few exceptions.
Last, we would like to point out that the visible successes come with some 
sacrifices in other important aspects. Owing to restructuring, corporate 
profitability has improved significantly. This pattern indicates that big 
businesses in Korea have been reorienting their focus from sales or 
market-share expansion to profitability or the rate of returns. These 
achievements might have come by sacrificing investment in physical capital 
and R&Ds. As noted in the preceding section, the ‘investment to GDP’ ratio 
has fallen substantially now, although it should be lower than the level of the 
excessive investment period before the 1997 crisis. More specifically, we can 
ask what has happened in terms of real competitiveness and efficiency of 
firms. This is important because more transparent corporate governance 
itself might not be the ultimate goal of firms unless it is translated into 
performance. 
The empirical analysis using the firm data by Park (2003) shows a little 
improvement in efficiency or productivity. It indicates that the rate of the 
total factor productivity change has rather decreased steadily from 2.4 % 
between 1996 and 1997 (pre-crisis period) to 1.2% between 1999 and 2000 











Korea 27 41 39 36 40
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Korea 28 61
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this productivity change into three sub-components of ‘technological change 
(rate of innovation),’ ‘scale efficiency change’ and ‘technical efficiency 
(distance from the production frontier) change,’ we note that the rate of 
technological change and technical efficiency change has rather declined 
over the entire (pre- and post-crisis) period.
3) Institutional Complementarity and Sequencing 
Hypothesis 3: 
3-1. One source of the implementation difficulty in reform has to do with 
institutional complementarity among sectors. 
3-2. The implementation of reforms should take a proper sequence, possibly 
moving from banking reform, to corporate governance reform, to labor relations 
reform, and then finally, to business restructuring.
Case 4: Connectedness between Business Restructuring, Capital Market 
Efficiency and Corporate Governance
Before the onset of the 1997 financial crisis, the Korean economy was a 
symbol of high growth. Thus, Korean firms had not experienced much 
restructuring of their businesses, namely, the process of selling-out, 
closing-down, or reducing unprofitable segments and subsidiaries. For this 
reason, the 1997 crisis was a big shock for the business sector. Post-crisis 
business restructuring was initiated by the government. The so-called ‘big 
deal’ program was to implement business swaps among the chaebols, or big 
conglomerates. Although the amount involved was so big, and thus, it was 
thought that the government had to play as an intermediary, the 
government-initiated big deal had achieved only mixed results. For 
example, the sale of LG’s semi-conductor line to Hyundai did not guarantee 
the success of Hyundai semi-conductor (Hynix after a name change). The 
troubled Hynix emerged as one of the biggest headache for the post-crisis 
Korean economy, although it has made a stunning turnaround recently.
As there were many criticisms of the government-initiated business 
restructuring, the government tried to take a different approach to those 
sectors which still seemed to need restructuring. The government only 
designated the names of those sectors and decided not to direct any concrete 
or detailed ways to restructuring for the second round of business 
restructuring starting in early 2001. These sectors included chemical fiber, 
paper production, cement, agricultural machines and so on. While the 
situation of these sectors was particularly bad, there was not much 
market-driven restructuring in the form of M&As, divestments, or 
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closing-downs. Thus, the government wanted to do something, but there 
was really not much things to do. Moreover, they did not want to be blamed 
again for “inefficient government intervention.” 
However, the ‘voluntary restructuring’ was not easy, either. While the 
government wanted firms to commit themselves to the major hauling of 
their businesses, the firms were saying that, without debt-equity swaps or 
debt rescheduling or reductions, horizontal restructuring among firms such 
as M&As would not happen. Commercial banks then said that without some 
words or even implicit signals from the government, they could not afford to 
give such favors as debt reductions or swaps to firms, and that it was better 
for the government to pour its own money to those troubled firms.
Below, we will see what went wrong in this second round of business 
restructuring with the paper production industry as a representative case (C. 
Lee et al., 2007). The paper industry was a mature industry, and there was 
world-wide restructuring mainly in the form of M&As. On the other hand, 
while Western firms refrained from expanding production capacity, Korean 
firms continued to expand the capacity throughout the 1990s with their 
capacity more than doubled from the 1990 level. The firms made losses and 
their debt ratios increased as the market turned into an excess capacity 
situation. 
Korean firms tried to deal with this situation in their own ways, with 
strategic alliances as the main responses. For example, two companies 
signed an agreement of ‘comprehensive strategic alliance’ in February 2001. 
This agreement was to coordinate their production, marketing, 
procurement, and logistic. Their motivations were known to overcome the 
limits of within-firm restructuring by affecting the market with some 
coordinated actions among the players.
However, it was an easy task to realize any merger deal. And the reason for 
this is noted as deficiency in market infrastructure, including the lack of 
intermediary bodies, corporate governance issues, and the related 
transparency problem in firms. First of all, since information revealed in the 
accounting books of the firms is neither accurate nor reliable, it cannot serve 
as the basis for price negotiation in M&A deals. While this is the first and 
immediate source for the price haggle, another source is the high premium 
for management control rights. As corporate governance is not clear, some 
diverse channels for the expropriation of company resources by the 
controller exist, so-called “tunneling.” They wanted to maintain their control 
over firms unless they are paid substantial premium because the stakes are 
very high for controlling management. For these reasons, the two sides tend 
to find it difficult to agree upon the prices of the target.
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While this case shows the limit of the so-called ‘voluntary restructuring’ 
without direct government involvement, it also exemplifies a market failure 
in the sense of the lack of an intermediary vehicle to facilitate the M&As and 
sales of firms, associated with the efficiency and size of the overall capital 
market in Korea. Another reason has to do with the prevalence of 
group-style firms in Korea. Since many firms are  affiliated firms of one 
business group or another, the restructuring is driven by group-level 
considerations, rather than at the level of each firms, which makes the 
process end up “intra-group” restructuring.
But, the point of the above story is not to blame the market-based or global 
standard approach itself, but rather, it is to emphasize the need to address 
certain necessary conditions for such an approach to be effective, or 
equivalently the importance of local specificity. We first noted the 
insufficient development of an intermediary vehicle to facilitate the M&As 
and sales of firms, and then pointed out the extra premium attached to the 
owner-controllers of the firms associated with the opaque nature of 
corporate governance. The existence of controllers' premium suggests that 
this part should be tackled first before we take the “market will do the job 
(M&A)” attitudes. 
Case 6: Connectedness between Labor Reform and Corporate 
Governance.
As Lee and Lee (1992) stressed, labor market in Korea during the high 
growth period used to be flexible, with management commanding full 
authority over workforce restructuring. Employment also used to be 
short-term oriented. However, after the turning point toward labor 
shortages and especially since the 1980s, employment practices gradually 
became longer. With democratization from the Roh Tae Woo government 
and after experiencing mass-scale labor strikes in 1987, the power of labor 
unions became stronger and the labor market turned into a very rigid one. 
However, this change was okay at least when the economy continued to 
grow as businesses were always in need of more work forces. 
Since the mid-1990s, the economy started to slow down and fell into the 
crisis in 1997. With this turn of events, labor market flexibility, especially the 
downsizing of workforce, emerged as one of the most issues in overall 
corporate restructuring. Actually it was in early 1997 even before the onset of 
the crisis that the first revision of labor-related laws was made by the strong 
demand from a management side. However, it was right after the crisis, 
namely February 1998, that the revised law officially allowed management 
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the right to discharge “redundant” workforce when companies are in bad 
situations.
To examine the process of workforce restructuring, we took the case of an 
automobile company which experienced, for the first time as a big company, 
a large-scale downsizing of workforce, after the revised labor law had come 
into practice. Well analyzed in C. Lee et al (2007), this was a very noteworthy 
case that attracted national and international attention given its size and 
meanings.
The company felt the need for workforce restructuring and initiated it 
since mid-1997 with the slowdown of the domestic market. The company 
formally announced the downsizing plan in April 1998. The plan estimated 
about 40.6% (18,730 employees) of its workforce as redundant workforce, as 
the firm was experiencing a 40% cut of production volume from the normal 
level. The company first started to invite three rounds of voluntary quit-off 
from April to June with a total of 4,455 workers filing for retirement. The 
initial response from labor was that no single worker can be laid off and 
work-sharing combined with the reduction of work hours should be 
introduced. As the bargaining between management and labor did not reach 
an agreement, the firm came up with the list of 2,678 workers to be 
discharged on July 20, and soon issued the actual order of discharge to 1,538 
workers on July 31. The labor union responded with six rounds of strikes, the 
occupation of work floors and sit-ins, starting on July 20, 1998. 
Finally, the government decided to intervene in the recognition of the 
importance of this case, especially for international investors. With the 
intermediary role of the government, on August 24, both sides of 
management and labor reached an agreement of the lay-off of 277 workers 
and 2,018 workers, given on-leave without pay as its core content. This 
agreement of lay-off, though the numbers were small, was an important 
compromise from the labor side, in light of its initial position against any 
lay-off, and, on the other hand, the reflection of management’s strong will, 
given the symbolic meaning of involuntary lay-off, the first case of its kind in 
Korea.
In sum, the company can be said to have achieved its goal, although not 
solely by the lay-off means, close to its original target of 10,166, if one 
includes those separated in the form of retirement and on-leave without pay. 
The short run cost of this process from the management side amounted to 
roughly 1 billion US dollars worth of cars with 100,000 units to be produced 
during the period of strikes, as well as minimum living subsidies to those on 
leave without pay and one-time complementary pays for those discharged 
and retired. Taking into these costs, the net benefits of the whole plan of 
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workforce downsizing are quite problematic. Moreover, as the company 
made a remarkable turn-around in 1999 even to the level of acquiring 
another major automobile company, the company recalled those who had 
been on-leave without pay and those who had been discharged earlier.
Also, if one knew such a quick turn-around in advance, one doubts 
whether it really had to go through all the hassles that hurt both sides of 
management and labor, in terms of not only monetary costs but also such 
symbolic values as job security and loyalty. This makes one wonder why 
both sides did not avoid the path toward mutual destruction or huge costs. 
We would like to point out the lack of transparency in the firm management 
and accounting matters as one of the most important reasons for both sides 
not to have reached an agreement in a better manner (C. Lee et al., 2007). It is 
often observed that management does not provide the labor side with 
sufficient information about the status of the company and tends to avoid 
huge profits from appearing in accounting books with a view to ward off the 
distribution demand from the labor side. At the same time, it is also the case 
to avoid losses, too, since they do not want to be blamed. As a matter of fact, 
the labor side argued that the accounting book showed a profit of 700 million 
won, but in reality the company (A automobile) made losses in 1997. It is 
widely broadcasted that the post-bankruptcy investigation of the accounting 
books of two other major automobile companies revealed the manipulation 
of the magnitude of several billion US dollars.
Given this situation and practices, it is hard to blame the labor side not 
believing what is told by management about the situation of the company. It 
is meaningless to provide the labor side with the accounting information of 
the company and to demand such information, since the accounting books 
are manipulated. Thus, labor unions had no choice, but simply demanded 
more from the other side, regardless of the situation of the company (C. Lee 
et al., 2007). Even when the company falls into troubles, the labor side 
perceives it as a fault of the management side, but feels that they are not 
responsible for it. As a result, they feel furious when they have to be laid off 
out of the situation which they are not responsible for.
At a more fundamental level, the issue of management transparency goes 
beyond the level of labor-management conflicts to the level of the top level 
governance. Only when a good corporate governance system is in place, one 
can expect transparent management and information disclosure to the labor 
side. Only after that, a more efficient and less costly bargaining between 
labor and management can prevail. This story is indicative of the connected 
nature of reforms, namely, the linkage between labor reform and corporate 
governance reform.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
1) Summary of the Findings
First, our analysis confirms that informal institutions take time to change 
or reform. This implies that macroeconomic reform might be easier than 
microeconomic and institutional reforms. We have found that reform tend to 
achieve some nominal success in terms of making new laws and several 
quantifiable targets (eg. debt-equity ratio; introduction of outside directors), 
and to be more successful in the area where interests conflicts are less acute 
(opening capital and M&A markets to foreigners). In contrast, the reform 
tend to make little success because it takes more time in really changing 
institutional conventions, habits and beliefs, such as enhancing transparency 
in management or trust in labor relations. Then, the lesson is that any serious 
reform blueprint should take this point into account. 
Second, one source of the implementation difficulty in reform has to do 
with institutional complementarity (Aoki and Okuno, 1996) among sectors. 
Because the character of one reform critically depends on the character of the 
others, we need to find out "general equilibrium” blueprint and/or take a 
proper sequence in reforms with the following connectedness in mind. To 
successfully carry out banking reform, which involves the writing-offs of 
bad loans, debt restructuring, and prudential regulation, is directly linked to 
business restructuring and labor market reform. But, to go ahead with 
business restructuring, it encounters the difficulty associated with the 
owner-controlled nature of Korean firms and corporate governance. Since 
the owners of firms have a high stake in the firms owing to opaque corporate 
governance, they tend to resist inter-firm restructuring (M&As or sales) of 
firms under their control unless paid very high premium. In labor market 
reform, the low level of transparency in management and governance tends 
to interfere with the reform effort to bring in more flexibility in the labor 
market. 
Third, the reform process tends to involve tension between the global 
standard and local specificity, which often becomes sources for the mixed 
results or new conflicts. Then, the difficulties arise from the fact that the new 
conflicts of interests and the related bargaining process add new 
complexities so that good elements are often blocked or distorted. In 
corporate governance reform, while the main agency cost problem in the 
Anglo-Saxon model of the firm is that of hired management, in the Korean 
chaebols it is the agency costs between controlling shareholders and minor 
non-controlling shareholders. In labor market reforms, one pre-condition for 
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labor flexibility is life-time education and the retraining system, which 
lacked in Korea. Without this, laid-off workers would find it more difficult to 
acquire new skills and jobs, and thus they resist strongly against layoffs. 
2) Concluding Remarks
Korea implemented one of the most comprehensively and decisively 
implemented reforms. As of now after 10 years after the break of the 1997 
crisis, the economy looks fine and some are concerned about the long term 
vitality of the economy. While the reform has brought Korean firms into the 
more stable, profitable and transparent state of business, the national 
economy is now suffering from weak investment and slow job creation. 
Some critics like Chang and Shin (2002) and K. Lee (2006) argued that such 
a situation is the price which the economy has paid in replacing the old 
catch-up model or East Asian one, not by the new catch-up model but by the 
Anglo-Saxon model which is more suitable for developed economies. Then, 
a valid question is whether our response (the blueprint) was right, namely 
the possibility of a wrong blueprint as noted in Fanelli and McMahon (2005), 
and also whether the sequencing was right (K. Lee, 2006).
Our reflection is that post-crisis Korea tried to become more market- or 
Anglo-Saxon model-oriented, but without paying attention to growth and 
competitiveness. For instance, banks were sold to foreigners who are 
basically conservative and focusing on consumer lending rather than 
industrial banking. While the Korean economy should continue to have a 
growth with more investment, the firms have stopped doing that now with 
one of lowest debt-equity ratios in the world, now about 100%. 
The issue of a wrong or right blueprint underscores the need to define a 
reform goal correctly. The goal of reform should not just be a movement 
toward a market-oriented economic system, but toward a growth-oriented 
one/or pro-growth market-oriented one. The final criterion for success 
should be whether it is able to enhance the long term growth potential and 
the competitiveness of the economy, which is the ultimate safe guard against 
the possibility for anther crisis. The firms had better be encouraged to pursue 
long term growth than short term profitability. The Korean corporate tigers 
look tamed on the surface, like Anglo-Saxon ones, but in the heart they still 
need to grow. Along this line of thought, we can identify three sub-goals of 
the reform, and the goals should be 1) creating jobs, 2) boosting new firms, 
and 3) reaching new markets, as they are most consistent with long term 
growth. 
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